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TORQUEMADA AND UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION APPEALS
William W. Milligan

A history filled with terror, violence, and arbitrariness has
tainted the regard thatAnglo-Americanjurisprudence gives to
the inquisitorial system, upon which the terrifying image of
Torquemada, Grand Inquisitor of Spain, has left its mark. Our
memory of many such inquisitions contains historical episodes
of biased examiners who elicited "the truth" ofreligious doctrinal
inertia, leading to witch-burnings and stunting the growth of
science. Our conscience retrieves these recurring themes in
literature and the media.
We hope, then, that in our modern democratic societies, we
have left the old practices in the past. We no longer condone
the secret hearings, the confessions and testimony extracted
by torture, and the public burning of convicts and people found
to be witches at the stake. Despite the discard of these harsh
practices, the inquisition as a style of eliciting the truth has
retained its dark images. Society attaches to the word "inquisition" connotations of witch hunts designed to discover the
rampant work of Satan in early Salem, Massachusetts, and
connotations of McCarthyism with its goal of uncovering the
work of communists in our midst.
So deeply imbedded in our psyche are the negative connotations of inquisition that the view appears in our jurisprudence.
Courts will often term disapproved methods of inquiry as
"Inquisitorial,'' when they mean to condemn violations of due
process, "manifestly unjust methods,'' and coercive questioning.
In other contexts, however, the word does not vitiate such
concerns. "Inquisitorial" is not a negative when used in comparison to "adversarial." In other words, the courts do not view
the inquisitorial style of fact-finding as per se unconstitutional,
so long as such a hearing meets basic requirements of due
process.
In fact, we have many inquisitorial proceedings in our system
today, such as arbitrators, coroners' inquests, summary courts
material, Congressional hearings many administrative hearings,
and institutional hearings such as those held by universities.
This Abstract and the Article which will follow focus on the Ohio
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review as an example
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of an inquisitorial proceeding. We would not immediately dismiss
these hearings as barbaric tools of terror.
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review shares
common factors with inquisitorial hearings. The directions of
the hearings vis-a-vis questioning ofwitnesses, is controlled by
the hearing officer rather than by the parties. The issues already
are defined by statute rather than by the pleadings. Statutes
provide the Board of Review with investigative authority. There
is no burden of proof. The Board of Review has its own rules,
but it is not bound by strict rules of civil procedure or by
standard rules of evidence. There is no jury.
Although Unemployment Compensation appeals are administrative hearings, the special circumstances of the large
numbers ofhearings that the system must bear will differentiate
them. When an administrative system need only conduct
relatively few hearings, e.g., the Public Utilities Commission,
it may devote more resources to the inquest. The hearing
examiner may apply rules of procedure and evidence. Parties
may have representation by counsel and procure discovery. Such
hearings are more adversarial and begin to resemble traditional
court proceedings. When the administrative system is burdened
by a heavy volume of hearings, however, the process becomes
more inquisitorial, driven by the constraints of time and scarce
resources. Ohio's hearing officers last year heard 20,419 appeals,
which typically lasted no more than forty-five minutes each.
Yet, the inquisitorial structure still has redeeming values.
Its evident durability, growing from the Justinian Code of
Roman Law, has become the basis for the legal systems of
Continental Europe and Latin America. The especially welldeveloped European inquisition has brought meticulous investigatory methods, careful scrutiny of testimony, strict
standards of evidence and investigation, and magistrates who
control the detailed investigatory procedures throughout the
entire hearing.
American courts have indicated that inquisitorial procedures
are not in themselves unconstitutional of unfair, so long as they
meet due process requirements. The question, then, is how to
define due process. Traditional methods of defining the term
include a right to cross-examine witnesses and a right to
adequate counsel. This definition does not apply to an
administrative hearing, however, because the definers have
assumed an adversarial system. The intent of the right to crossexamination in an adversarial system is to ensure that opposing
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sides have the opportunity to elicit the truth from what is
presented to the record. In an examination, it is possible that
neither side has representation competent enough to make an
effective cross-examination of the evidence. In such a case, the
hearing officer must take the place of the counsel in examining
the evidence. The officer's dilemma is maintaining impartiality,
while making an effective examination. Without this impartiality, the procedure is in danger of being a sham.
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review maintains
an informal proceeding. A recent survey indicated that parties
had representation by counsel in only twenty-six percent of
cases. This informality presents a challenge to a system that
needs to ensure due process. A trial judge is bound by rules of
evidence and procedure, whereas a hearing officer is not. The
hearing officer is bound only by discretion, and therein lies a
danger of arbitrariness.
The Supreme Court has analyzed the question of due process
in several approaches. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 1 the Court describes
minimal procedural safeguards: the opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and manner, timely and adequate notice, oral
presentation of evidence and argument, well stated reasons for
decisions based upon the record, and an impartial decision
maker. The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge 2 adopted a balancing
test, balancing the affected private interests, the government
interests, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of private
interests against the probable value of substitute procedural
safeguards.
The requirement of due process remains critical in both the
adversarial and the inquisitorial systems, but the methods of
achieving it differ. In an examination, where the parties might
not have adequate representation, a hearing officer, unlike a
judge presiding over an adversarial process, has a duty to
conduct the hearin~ in the manner that counsel would have
used. The hearing officer has the duty to delineate the issues,
to present factual contentions in an orderly manner, to conduct
effective interrogation ofwitnesses, and to safeguard the rights
of the parties. The failure to recognize this distinction between
a traditional trial proceeding and an examination limits the
hearing officer to following the example of the adversarial trial
court, which has been the bias of our jurisprudence. In order

1.
2.

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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to insure the legitimacy of the administrative hearing, we should
conduct first class examination rather than second class trials.

